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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
H. C. HARGRAVES, Building Inspec-
tor for Salt Lake City, a municipal 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
HARRY L. YOUNG, KENNETH L. 
ANDERSON and WILLIAM W AL-
KENHORST, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8275 
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COME NOW the defendants and respondents in the above 
entitled case and petition the court for a rehearing upon the 
following grounds: 
I. In determining that the structures in question are within 
the terms of the ordinance, the appellate court has invaded 
the province of the trial court as a finder of fact. 
II. In holding that the prohibiting of the structures in 
question is reasonably related to the public health, safety, 
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morals and general welfare, the court has relied on a line of 
cases which has no applicability to the facts in this case. 
A Brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT ONE 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE STRUCTURES IN 
. QUESTION ARE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE ORDI-
NANCE, THE APPELLATE COURT HAS INVADED THE 
PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT AS A FINDER OF 
FACT. 
POINT TWO 
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROHIBITING OF THE 
STRUCTURES IN QUESTION IS REASONABLY RELAT-
ED TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS AND 
GENERAL WELFARE, THE COURT HAS RELIED ON A 
LINE OF CASES WHICH HAS NO APPLICABILITY TO 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
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POINT ONE 
IN DETERMINING THAT THE STRUCTURES IN 
QUESTION ARE WITHIN THE TERMS OF THE ORDI-
NANCE, THE APPELLATE COURT HAS INVADED THE 
PROVINCE OF THE TRIAL COURT AS A FINDER OF 
FACT. 
Because of the brevity of the op1n1on rendered by the 
Court in this case, it is difficult to determine the grounds upon 
which the Court held that the structures in question were 
within the terms of the Salt Lake City ordinances here being 
considered. We are unable to tell whether the Court is holding 
by this opinion that any device, structure or growth is pro-
hibited in a sideyard regardless of whether or not it may be 
part of a building or whether the court is holding, contrary 
to the holding of the trial court, that the carports or rigid 
awnings in question actually do constitute a part of the build-
ing. It is submitted that this point should be clarified. Left 
in the position in which the opinion heretofore rendered leaves 
it, doubt is thrown upon the right of a landowner to have 
anything in his sideyards. The language of the court could 
be constructed to prohibit trees, clothes-line poles, beach um-
brellas, shrubbery or anything else that extends above the 
surface of the ground. Such was certainly not the intention 
of the City Commission in adopting the ordinance in question. 
The clear intendment discernable from the language of the 
ordinance is otherwise. The Section of the Ordinance quoted 
by the Court is as follows: 
'' (a) The area of a side or rear yard shall be open 
and unobstructed, except for the ordinary projections 
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of window sills, belt courses, cornices and other orna-
mental features to the extent of not more than 4 inches 
except that where the building is not more than 2 inches 
in height the cornice or eaves may project not more 
than 2 feet into such yard ... " Sec. 6727, Revised Or-
dinances of Salt Lake City, 1944. 
It will be noted that all of the exceptions contained in the 
above quoted section apply to things which are definitely and 
unmistakably integral parts of the building. No exception is 
made as to such matters as trellises, fences, detachable awnings, 
trees or shrubbery, which are commonly found in every side 
yard for the reason that the clear intendment of the ordinance 
is to apply only to buildings and, therefore, no exception is 
needed as to things which are not parts of buildings. 
The basic statute to which the exceptions above quoted 
apply reads as follows: 
((In all Residential A, A-3, B-2, districts, for every 
building erected there shall be a side yard along each 
lot line. The least dimension of any such side yard 
shall be 3 5% of the building height, but in no case less 
than 8 feet for Residential A and A-3 ... " Sec. 6725, 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944. 
The only interpretation that can be placed upon this section 
is to the effect that the side yard requirements shall apply to 
buildings and not to other devices which may ordinarily be 
found in a yard. It does not seem conceivable, therefore, that 
the court could have intended to extend the application of 
the ordinance regarding side yards to things which are not 
parts of the buildings. 
Assuming, therefore, that the court intended to extend the 
statute only to buildings, we are still left with an uncertainty 
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as to whether or not the court construed the rigid awnings or 
car ports in question as being independent buildings them-
selves, or whether they are constructed as being integral parts 
of the residences. It seems quite clear from the city ordinances 
that they cannot be considered as independent buildings in 
themselves. 
Section 401 of the Building Code defines a building as 
follows: 
"A building is any structure built for the support, 
shelter and enclosure of persons, animals, chattels or 
movable property of any kind.'' 
As was pointed out in our brief in this case, there is no en-
closure involved here. Therefore, the structures cannot be con-
sidered as independent buildings in and of themselves, and 
it does not appear logical that this court would have so con-
sidered them. We are then left with the supposition that this 
court must have considered the structures as an integral part 
of the resiqential building. 
It is respectfully submitted that if the appellate court did 
thies, it invaded the province of the trial court as a finder of 
fact. The legal principles to which we must have reference 
to determine whether or not an improvement becomes part of 
the realty or part of the building are too well established to 
require reiteration here. Suffice it to say that the trial court 
found under the evidence by applying such legal principles 
that these devices were not parts of the buildings. They are 
not permanently attached to the building; they are bolted to 
the building and are readily and easily removable without 
damage to the building. On the open side they are supported 
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by posts, which are also readily removable. Based upon this 
evidence, the trial court found, as a matter of fact, that the 
devices in question were not parts of the buildings but were 
merely adjuncts thereto, just as would . be a television aerial 
or any other readily removable improvement. The principle 
that an appellate court should not disturb a finding of fact by 
the lower court which is supported by creditable evidence is 
well established. In this regard see Clark v. Dulien Steel 
Products, Inc. et al, (Cal) 128 Pac. (2d) 608; Koury v. Vogel, 
et al, (Okla) 130 Pac. (2d) 93; Fitzkee v. Turner (Cal) 75 
Pac. (2d) 522 and Stow et al v. Bruce et al (Okla) 61 Pac 
2d) 104;,. 
The question of whether a finding that a structure at-
tached to but removable from the realty actually becomes a 
part of the realty is a question of law or fact was considered 
by the District Court of appeal in California in the case of 
Oakley v. Butler, 59 Pac. (2d) 826. Certiorari was denied 
by the Supreme Court of California. In the Oakley case certain 
improvements were made to a building by an assignee under 
a contract of sale. The original vendee defaulted and the 
vendor brought foreclosure action. The assignees in possession 
maintained that certain i~provements which they had installed 
were not part of the realty and so not subject to foreclosure. 
The trial court held with the assignees to the effect that the 
improvements were not part of the realty. This ruling was 
attacked on appeal. In refusing to pass upon this matter on 
appeal, the appellate court stated: 
"The question as to whether or not property affixed 
to real estate becomes a part of the real estate is ordi-
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narily a question of fact to be determined by the trial 
court from all of the evidence in the case. tA thing is 
deemed to be affixed to land when it is * * * embedded 
in it, as in the case of walls; or permanently resting 
upon it, as in the case of buildings; or permanently 
attached to what is thus permanent, as by means of 
cement, plaster, nails, bolt, or screws.' Civ. Code, Sec. 
660. tWhen a person affixes his property to the land 
of another, without an agreement permitting him to 
remove it, the thing affixed, except as provided in 
section ten hundred and nineteen, belongs to the owner 
of the land, unless he chooses to require the former 
to remove it.' Civ. Code, Sec. 1013. In Andrews v. First 
Realty Corporation, 6 Cal. App. (2d) 407, 44 P (2d) 
628, it is said: tThe question whether the property in-
volved in this case became a fixture or remained per-
sonal property is a question of fact to be determined 
by the fact finder upon all the facts and circumstances 
in evidence bearing upon the question. It is the duty 
of this court on appeal to view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the respondent; and if we find any 
substantial evidence to sustain the findings of the trial 
court it is our duty not to disturb such findings." 
Certainly in this case there is creditable evidence from which 
the district court could have found that the devices in question 
were not part of the building and from which he did so find. 
As has been pointed out above, the structures are not per-
manently attached, but are readily removable. They are no 
different in principal from a large umbrella erected in a side 
yard which would extend across and afford shade and protec-
tion from rain to the driveway. The trial court having so 
found, its decision in this matter should not be disturbed by 
the appellate court. 
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POINT TWO 
IN HOLDING THAT THE PROHIBITING OF THE 
STRUCTURES IN QUESTION IS REASONABLY RELAT-
ED TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY, MORALS AND 
GENERAL WELFARE, THE COURT HAS RELIED ON A 
LINE OF CASES WHICH HAS NO APPLICABILITY TO 
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE. 
As a basis for its holding that the prohibiting of the devices 
here concerned is reasonably related to the public health, safety, 
morals or general welfare, this Court relies upon the case of 
Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U. S. 603, 71 L. Ed. 605, 47 S. Ct. 675. 
We have no quarrel with Goreib v. Fox, except that it has no 
applicability to the facts of the case now before the court. 
Goreib v. Fox did not give cities carte blanc power to enact 
zoning ordinances as evidenced by the fact that 1nany zoning 
ordinances have been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court since Gorieb v. Fox. In that case the city ordinance com-
plained of required buildings in the designated residential 
area to have a designated set-back. The building which was 
there proposed was a commercial building set flush with the 
street having a two story brick wall erected right on the front 
property line. The Supreme court sustained the ordinance 
pointing out a number of reasons why the proposed structure 
might be detrimental to the public health, safety or general 
welfare. None of these reasons have any applicability to the 
instant case however. The Supreme court goes into the question 
there of ·light and air, plus vision of drivers at intersections, 
etc. As we have previously pointed out, we have no question 
here of interference with light, air or vision;we have no question 
10 
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of congestion of population; we have no questoin of fire 
hazard. The only question involved is one of aesthetic values. 
In a later case, Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 
183, 72 Law Ed. 842, the Supreme Court of the United States 
struck down a zoning ordinance as having no relation to public 
morals, safety or public welfare when such an ordinance acted 
to prohibit a commercial building in an area which was com-
mercial in character. These devices are consistent with the use 
of the area for residential purposes. They have no detrimental 
effect on the public welfare, health or safety. They are not 
opposed by the persons most direct! y concerned-those living 
next door, as evidenced by the letters from these individuals 
contained in the city files and introduced in evidence in the 
court below. 
There is no line of cases depending upon Gorieb v. Fox 
or any other fundamental decision upholding the right of the 
city to prohibit devices such as there in residential areas. The 
only two cases which we have been able to discover decided 
by the Courts in the country definitely hold that these devices 
do not violate set back or side yard requirements. These cases 
are: Olcott v. Sheppard Knapp Co., 89 N. Y. Supp. 201 and 
French v. Cooper, 43 Atl. (2d) 880. The case of French v. 
Cooper is directly in point with the case here being considered. 
We wish again to quote from the language of the Court 1n 
that case: 
"The sketch returned with the record discloses that 
the building proper has the necessary setbacks on both 
Atlantic Ave. and North Street and in the absence of 
proof to the contrary, we hold that the awning is not 
11 
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a part of the building. There is no evidence that it is 
permanent! y attached to the building and it is at most 
an adjunct thereto, i. e. added but not essentially a 
part thereof. 
nit is settled that a municipality has no po\ver to 
limit the use to which property may be put unless the 
regulation is designed to promote public health, safety 
and general welfare. Durkin Lbr. Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 
106 NJL 183, 147 Atl. 555. We fail to see in what 
respect the erection of this awning can adversely affect 
public health, safety or general welfare. The absence 
of a brief on behalf of the respondents suggests that 
they too experience the same quandry. The fact that 
nearby property owners have expressed themselves as 
favoring the proposed awning and they have no ob-
jection waives against the reasonableness of the decision 
to refuse the permit. Prosecutor is entitled to his permit 
and costs." 
CONCLUSION 
Brevity is certainly a virtue to be applauded in judicial 
decisions or in any other writing, provided the ground is 
covered adequately~ However, a decision of an appellate court 
has a function other than to merely determine the disposition 
of the case immediately before the court. If such were the only 
purpose all cases could be disposed_ of either by the words, 
"reversed and remanded" or "affirmed." The decision in this 
case does little to advise the city officials or the residents of 
the city what they can or cannot do in regard to the erection 
of structures in their sideyards. The basis of the decision is 
left to conjecture. It will leave the law in such a state of uncer-
12 
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tainty as to place persons desiring to improve their property 
in a position of peril and will lead to further litigation. 
It is submitted that a rehearing should be granted in 
this case and the principles set forth in the brief in support 
of this petition should be examined by and disposed of by this 
court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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